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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 10:28 pm
Time: 10:28 pm
Results for data protection
4 results foundAuthor: European Parliament. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Title: The US legal system on data protection in the field of law enforcement. Safeguards, rights and remedies for EU citizens Summary: In US law, there are a number of different legal sources that govern data protection in the field of federal law enforcement. This study first considers the two most important sources of data protection law-the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution and the Privacy Act of 1974. It then turns to the most significant methods of information collection that are available for ordinary criminal investigations and national security investigations and the data protection guarantees set down under the laws authorizing and regulating such information collection. The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government. Reasonableness is established if the search or seizure is conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, that is, a judicial order based on a showing of probable cause and on a particular description of the property to be searched and the items to be seized. Reasonableness can also be established if one of the exceptions to the warrant requirements exists. In the data protection context, however, the application of the Fourth Amendment is relatively limited because of the third-party records doctrine which holds that individuals do not have an expectation of privacy in personal data that they voluntarily turn over to third parties like financial institutions and communications providers. With regard to EU citizens, the Supreme Court has held that foreign citizens resident abroad are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Among U.S. laws, the Privacy Act of 1974 is the closest analogue to a European data protection law in that it seeks to regulate comprehensively personal data processing, albeit only with respect to federal government departments and agencies. It regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of all types of personal information, by all types of federal agencies, including law enforcement agencies. At a general level, the Privacy Act contains most of the elements of the EU right to personal data protection. However, it only protects US citizens and permanent residents, not EU citizens. Furthermore, there are a number of exemptions available specifically for law enforcement agencies. As a result, the benefits of the proposed legislation on judicial redress for EU citizens are unclear. The proposed legislation contemplates three types of law suits, two of which are designed to protect the right of access to and correction of personal data, and one of which enables individuals to obtain compensation for unlawful disclosures of personal data. Since law enforcement agencies commonly exempt their data bases from the access requirements of the Privacy Act, the right of action for intentional or willful disclosures that cause actual damage is the only one that would be available on a general basis. In investigations involving ordinary crime, there are at least three different methods of personal data collection available to law enforcement officials: (1) use of private sources like commercial data brokers; (2) court and administrative subpoenas; (3) electronic surveillance and access to electronic communications based on a court order under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. These information-gathering methods afford the same level of data protection for US and EU citizens. With respect to EU data protection law, however, some of these methods contain relatively few data protection guarantees. In the case of private sources of personal data, this is attributable to the absence of a comprehensive data protection scheme in the private sector and the vast quantities of personal information freely available to market actors and, consequently, also to law enforcement officials. With respect to the subpoena power and access to communications metadata and subscriber records (under the Stored Communications Act and the Pen Register Act), the lack of significant data protection guarantees is associated with the standard of "relevance" to any type of criminal investigation and the permissive application of that standard by the courts. The law and jurisprudence of "relevance," in turn, is driven by the failure of US law to recognize a robust privacy interest in the personal data held by corporate entities and other third parties. In investigations involving national security threats, which can involve both an intelligence and a law enforcement component, there are a number of additional means available to the government: (1) a special type of administrative subpoena known as a "national security letter"; (2) surveillance authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); (3) any other form of intelligence gathering authorized by Executive Order 12,333 (and not covered by FISA). The information gathered through such methods can be shared with criminal prosecutors if relevant for law enforcement purposes. Foreign intelligence gathering, both inside and outside the United States, follows a two-track scheme, one for US persons and another for non-US persons. With the exception of FISA electronic and physical surveillance orders, the data protection guarantees afforded to non-US persons are minimal. The stated intent of Presidential Policy Directive 28 is to provide for stronger personal data protection for non-US persons, but it is difficult to come to any conclusions at this point in time on what effect it will have. More generally, even with respect to US persons, personal data protection under foreign intelligence law raises a couple of questions. The first concerns the point in time when the right to privacy is burdened by government action. The US government has suggested that in the case of bulk collection of personal data, harm to the privacy interest only occurs after the personal data is used to search, or results from a search of, the information included in the data base. This position stands in marked contrast with EU law, where it is well established that bulk collection, even before the personal data is accessed, is a serious interference with the right to personal data protection because of the number of people and the amount of personal data involved. The second question concerns the conditions under which personal data can be shared between intelligence and law enforcement officials. In the realm of data processing by law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the European courts have emphasized that intrusive surveillance can only be conducted to combat serious threats that are carefully defined in law. They have also held that the information that results from such surveillance can only be used to combat those serious threats, whether to take national security measures or to prosecute the associated criminal offenses. In US law, by contrast, the law allows for intelligence to be transferred to the police and criminal prosecutors for any type of law enforcement purpose.. Details: Brussels: European Union, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 21, 2015 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519215/IPOL_STU(2015)519215_EN.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 137049 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationsData ProtectionFourth AmendmentIntelligence GatheringPrivacy Act of 1974Search and Seizure |
Author: European Commission Title: Profiling: Protecting citizens' rights, fighting illicit profiling Summary: One of the biggest challenges posed by the global technological evolution to the right of data protection is the processing of such data in the context of profiling. UNICRI is leading a consortium of partners in the implementation of a new project which seeks to outline the main risks to human rights involved in profiling practices. The PROFILING project has been funded by the European Commission, DG Justice, under the Fundamental Rights and Citizens programme. It is focused on identifying and tackling the challenges posed by technology to the fundamental right to data protection. Main objectives -Identifying the risks related to the extensive use of profiling -Identifying the level of awareness of the responsible authorities of the Member States on the risks deriving from the use of profiling -Identifying the level of awareness of a selected sample/group of interviewers in testing partner countries -Identifying the countermeasures adopted in all EU Member States. Main activities: 1.A background analysis on profiling and its impact on fundamental rights 2.A risk assessment based on the results of the background analysis 3.A series of questionnaires elaborated and tested with the national Data Protection Authorities of the 28 EU Member States and Switzerland, to assess the present European legal framework 4.Fieldwork in three selected countries - Romania, Germany and Italy - exploring automated profiling in different domains of applications: political activism (Germany), border control (Italy) and e-commerce (Romania). Details: Brussels: European Commission, 2014. 205p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 24, 2016 at: http://profiling-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Profiling_final_report_20141.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://profiling-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Profiling_final_report_20141.pdf Shelf Number: 137959 Keywords: Data ProtectionPrivacyProfilingRights |
Author: Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina Title: EU-US cooperation on justice and home affairs - an overview Summary: The United States is the key partner of the European Union in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), including in the fight against terrorism. While formal cooperation on JHA issues between the US and the EU goes back to the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, it is since 2001 in particular that cooperation has intensified. Today, and for the period up until 2020, the key areas of transatlantic efforts in the JHA field are personal data protection, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, migration and border controls, tracing of firearms and explosives, money laundering and terrorism financing, cybercrime, drugs and information exchange. Regular dialogues at all levels, extensive operational cooperation and a series of legal agreements demonstrate the development of the transatlantic partnership on JHA. Assessments state that cooperation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism has led to hundreds of successful joint operations each year, and many foiled terrorist plots. Nevertheless, important challenges remain, in particular in light of the revelations of US mass surveillance activities and the resultant growth in EU concerns about US standards for data privacy. The European Parliament is making use of its extended powers in the JHA field, by urging a high level of data protection as well as effective and non-discriminatory means of redress for EU citizens in the US over improper use of their personal data. Details: Strasbourg: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138606 Keywords: Border SecurityCounter-TerrorismCybercrimeData ProtectionDrug TraffickingExtremist GroupsInformation SharingMoney LaunderingPartnershipsTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: McIntyre, T.J. Title: Criminals, Data Protection and the Right to a Second Chance Summary: In 2016 Ireland belatedly introduced legislation to allow for the expungement of adult criminal records and, in doing so, highlighted a changing technological and legal context which challenges the assumptions underlying rehabilitation laws. The potential impact of convictions on individuals' life chances has increased as mandatory vetting has become more widespread. Even where vetting is not required, internet search engines render criminal histories easily accessible to curious third parties. In the other direction, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have developed privacy and data protection principles which require states to limit the availability of information about old convictions. In this article we outline the limitations of the Irish legislation and use it as a case study to consider these wider issues, examining how it illustrates the growing importance of European privacy and data protection norms in national criminal justice and rehabilitation systems. Details: (2017) 58 Irish Jurist (ns) 27. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2018 at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3150591 Year: 2017 Country: Ireland URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3150591 Shelf Number: 150108 Keywords: Criminal RecordsData ProtectionExpungementOffender Rehabilitation |